USSR Council of Ministers
On September 29, 1966, the USSR Council of Ministers passed a decree approving the construction of the first gigantic new generation of water-graphite nuclear reactors (later they became known as RBMK – high-performance channel reactors). International Atomic Energy Agency, International Advisory Group on Nuclear Safety, “The Chernobyl Accident: Update of INSAG1″, Safety Series No. 75 – INSAG7, 1992 (hereinafter INSAG7), 32; Schmid, Producing Power, 111.RBMK was a triumph of the Soviet gigantomastia, a testament to the eternal desire of its creators on a large scale: The volume was 20 times larger than that of western reactors and could generate 3200 mW of thermal energy or 1000 mW of electricity – enough to supply half of the population of Kiev. Alexander states that the typical core of a 1300 megawatt power reactor used in the west had a diameter of 3.4 m and a height of 4.3 m (“Chornobyl Accident Revisited”, 158). See also: Josephson, Red Atom, 299t6.
In the USSR, the new reactor was declared “national” – not only technologically unique, but also the largest in the world, “Chornobyl Accident Revisited”, 156-57; Schmid, Producing Power, 115 and 123.
Anatoly Alexandrov, the bald director of the Kurchatov Institute, personally took the laurels of the RBMK designer by registering the invention with the patent office. Schmid, Producing Power, 290n124. Unlike its main competitor VVER – a complex technical structure that its opponents referred to as the “American reactor” because of the similarities to pressurized water reactors popular in the United States – parts of RBMK could be manufactured in existing plants, but this did not require complex processing Josephson, Red Atom, 36. The modular device – hundreds of graphite blocks assembled into columns – made it easy to assemble RBMKs on-site and increase them as needed to further increase performance.
Alexandrov also saved money by giving up building an airtight shell. Schmid, Producing Power, 112. This thick concrete dome covered almost every reactor in the west In the event of a serious accident, prevent radioactive contamination from spreading outside the station. With the enormous size of RBMK, a sealed case would double the cost of building each unit. A more economical decision was made: to divide the reactor into 1,600 pressure pipes and to wrap each pair of fuel elements in a thin metal shirt, which, according to the inventors, made a serious accident extremely unlikely. Zhores Medvedev, the legacy of Chernobyl, 236.
To prevent this, the developers provided a pressurized cooling system for compressed nitrogen, and the reactor operators at all levels of the nuclear industry were trained at all costs to maintain a constant water supply to the reactor.
In theory, of course, worse accidents were possible. Calculations showed that if at least three or four of the 1600 pressure pipes in the reactor burst at the same time, the unexpected The release of high-pressure steam can lift all 2,000 tons of Helena and Piglet from their bases, interrupting each of the remaining steam lines and all pressure lines and cause a devastating explosion. International Atomic Energy Agency, INSAG7, 9. However, the designers did not consider it necessary to prepare for such a hazard, but considered this to be beyond reasonable reason. Charles K. Dodd, Industrial Decision Making and High-Risk Technology: Location of Nuclear Power Plants in the USSR (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994), 83–84. Nevertheless, such a scenario was given the name “hypothetical accident”.Now the term “accident outside the design base” is used. – Note scientifically ed.
The first RBMK was built in 1970 at the Sredmash station on the shores of the Gulf of Finland near Leningrad. Dodd, Industrial Decision Making and High-Risk Technology, App.A. In the meantime, the Kiev branch of the Teploelektroproekt design institute chose a place for the first nuclear power plant. The selection was quickly reduced to two places. However, the first was reserved for a fossil fuel power plant, and the USSR Council of Ministers passed a decree to build a new 2,000-megawatt republican station on the riverside near the village of Kopachi in the Kiev region, 14 km from Chernobyl. At this point, the Sredmash leadership still had to decide which type of reactor they would build in a new location. Three options were considered: a gas-cooled graphite model (RK-1000), VVER and RBMK. At first, RBMK was abandoned as a technologically and economically poorer project and opted for the more advanced and safer gas-cooled RK-1000. In mid-1969, however, ambitious targets for deadlines for building nuclear power plants began to fade. Smash understood that despite all its shortcomings, the water-graphite giant could be built faster than a more complex gas-cooled model. The choice fell again on RBMK. Six months later, Viktor Bryukhanov was called to the Ministry of Energy and Electrification and commissioned to build the first two RBMK-1000 reactors at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (International Atomic Energy Agency, INSAG7, 32-33; Schmid, Producing Power, 120-25).
The first RBMK reactor at Leningrad station was put into operation on December 21, 1973.
The proud fathers of RBMK-1000, Anatoly Alexandrov from the Kurchatov Institute and Nikolai Dollezhal from NIKIET, were present at the launch. Construction of the second block in Leningrad was already underway, and the builders began preparing locations in Chernobyl and Kursk. However, the first Leningrad reactor did not reach full capacity when it became clear that The developers’ desire to spend their child quickly from peak to serial production was expensive. The first unit of the Leningrad NPP reached its full design capacity 11 months after it started on November 1, 1974 (Schmid, Producing Power, 114). Serious design flaws persecuted RBMK right from the start. Some came to light immediately, others much later.
The first problem was due to a positive vapor coefficient – in the event of a loss of coolant, this disadvantage made Soviet water graphite reactors vulnerable to uncontrolled chain reactions, which RBMK has exacerbated due to attempts to reduce process costs. International Atomic Energy Agency, INSAG7, 35–37. After starting the first engine in the Leningrad NPP, one of the developers found that the higher the fuel consumption, the higher the effect of a positive steam coefficient. The longer the reactor was operated, the more difficult it became to control it.
The second disadvantage of the reactor was its colossal size. RBMK was so big that The reactivity in one part of the core was only weakly linked to the reactivity in the other part. International Atomic Energy Agency, INSAG7, 6. The operators did not have to manage it as one unit, but as several reactors in one. A specialist compared this to an apartment building in which a family could celebrate a fun wedding and neighbors celebrate. Veniamin Pryanishnikov, interview with the author of the book, Kiev, February 13, 2006.
A third mistake lurked at the heart of the reactor emergency response system – the last line of defense in the event of an accident. Sich, “Chornobyl Accident Revisited”, 185. The first design documentation for RBMK included the use of seven-meter CPS rods with a seven-meter absorber and displacer that pierced the core from top to bottom when lowered. 68 of them were to serve as stakes in the emergency response system (SAZ). However, according to the final scheme, none of the bars was long enough to pierce the core completely, leaving only 21 instead of 68 SAZ bars. In second-generation RBMK reactors, the number of SAZ rods was increased to 24, with the total number of rods reaching 211. When operators are faced with a situation that requires an emergency stop – such as a serious radiator leak or an uncontrolled response – they can press the reactor emergency stop button and the final stage of the five-stage power reduction system known as AZ -5, start. However, the AZ-5 mechanism did not provide for a sharp emergency stop. International Atomic Energy Agency, INSAG7, 45. Dollezhal and technologists from NIKIET developed the AZ-5 system only to gradually reduce the reactor output to zero.
August 1, 1977, The No. 1 reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant finally went into critical condition. Nikolai Steinberg, interview with the author of the book, Kyiv, May 28, 2017, On September 27th at 8.10 p.m., the first Ukrainian nuclear power went through 110 and 330-kilovolt lines and was transferred to Soviet power grids.
However, the operators of Chernobyl soon discovered that the reactor they so much admired was not inclined to forgive a single mistake. RBMK’s instability made it so difficult to deal with that not only mental but physical exertion was required of senior engineers. They made changes every minute and couldn’t even sit down and sweat as if they were digging a trench. Steinberg, interview with the author of the book, 2015.
The operators tortured the console, so the switches on the control rod kept failing and had to be replaced
In 1980, NIKIET conducted a closed study and identified nine major design flaws and thermohydraulic instabilities that violated the safety of RBMK. The report said that Accidents are not only possible under rare and unlikely conditions, but are also expected to occur during continuous operation.Kopchinsky G., Steinberg N. Tschernobyl: On the past, the present and the future. P. 82. However, no changes were made to the design of the reactor, and the plant personnel were not warned of possible dangers.
In the early evening of September 9, 1982, Nikolai Steinberg was sitting in his office on the third floor between the 1st and 2nd block above the ventilation pipe that the two Chernobyl reactors had in common.The KGB report on this incident, which was written the next day, is contained in: From the archives / Ed. Yu. Danilyuk. Document No. 9: “Report of the KGB in Kiev and the Kiev region to the Second Directorate of the KGB of the USSR and the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR on an emergency shutdown of the reactor of the 1st unit of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant on September 9, 1982”, 10. September 1982. When Steinberg saw steam coming out of the vent pipe, he knew that this meant problems: at least a pipe break in the reactor and radiation emissions.
He called the 1st unit shift to warn operators of the need to shut down the reactor, but the shift manager rejected his words. Steinberg insisted that his boss hung up. Steinberg gathered his staff and waited for a call to the accident. But nobody called. Almost six hours passed, and at midnight he and his people got into the cars and drove back to Pripyat.
When Steinberg returned to work the next morning, he heard that there were actually problems in block 1 – he couldn’t find anything despite his post and experience. From the beginning, the director Bruchanov and the chief engineer of the station insisted on himself: No matter what happened on the station, there was no radiation emission. In fact, the wind and rain-borne radioactive infection reached Pripyat and spread 14 km from the train station. From archives / Ed. Yu. Danilyuk. Document No. 12: “Report of the KGB in Kiev and the Kiev region in the KGB of the USSR and the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR on the radioactive contamination of the industrial site of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant as a result of the accident of September 9, 1982”, September 14, 1982, and Document No. 13: “Report of the Head of the KGB in the Kiev and Kiev Region To the Chairman of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR regarding the radiation situation at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant site following the accident of September 9, 1980, October 30, 1982; Viktor Kovtutsky, chief accountant of the Chernobyl construction department, interview with the author of the book, Kiev, April 2016; Yesaulov A. City that is not. P. 19.The radiation level in the village of Chistogalovka, 5 km from the train station, was hundreds of times higher than normal. The infected areas in the immediate vicinity of the station were simply spilled with water and covered with earth and leaves. In Pripyat, decontamination wagons poured foam on the streets on Lenin Avenue and quietly laid new asphalt.
As a result, more serious accidents will occur in other Soviet nuclear power plants – and everyone will be hidden. In October 1982, a generator exploded in an Armenian nuclear power plant near the city of Metsamor, and the turbine hall burned out. Less than three years had passed when the bypass valve exploded when the reactor at Balakovo NPP went into operation. Superheated steam at a temperature of 300 ° C broke out into the annular spaces around the reactor vessel. Fourteen people were cooked alive. Both accidents were hidden, and only rumors and vague references in the Pravda newspaper reached the operators at other stations. Interview with Steinberg, Glukhov and Kupny; Grigori Medvedev, The Truth About Chernobyl, 19th
At the time when Viktor Bryukhanov signed the final day of 1983, this confirmed the completion of the construction of the 4th engine of the V.I. Lenin The world spoke of only one nuclear accident. The date of commissioning of the 4th engine was confirmed by Nikolai Fomin, ChNPP chief engineer. See: Karpan, From Chernobyl to Fukushima, 143. And that humiliation fell on the United States.
In the early morning hours of March 28, 1979, a handful of small resin balls with fewer mustard seeds and resin balls for water purification clogged a valve in the secondary cooling circuit of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, PA. For a brief description of the accident, see Mahaffey, Atomic Accidents, 342–50, and Mahaffey, Atomic Awakening, 314–317. For more details, see the report: Mitchell Rogovin and George T. Frampton Jr. (NRC Special Inquiry Group), Three Mile Island: A Report to Commissioners and the Public (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1980). Over the next 24 hours, a number of minor equipment malfunctions and human errors resulted in a serious loss of the cooler, partial dehydration, and exposure of the core. The core started to melt and this contaminated the biological defense building with thousands of liters of radioactive water. The staff had no choice and radioactive gases were released directly into the atmosphere. Although no one was affected by the release – a cloud of short-lived inert gas isotopes that were transported to the Atlantic – the news of the accident caused panic.
In the United States, the development of nuclear energy, already undermined by rising construction costs and public concerns, stopped almost overnight
Although this happened in the United States, in the USSR news about the accident Three Mile Island censored – for fear that this will tarnish the flawless reputation of a peaceful atom.Grigori Medvedev, The Truth About Chernobyl. The causes of the disaster were explained by the shortcomings of the capitalist system. William C. Potter, Soviet Chernobyl Decision Making: An Analysis of System Performance and Policy Change.
What is the Difference Between Losers and Winners
What is the Difference Between Losers and Winners
Man is a social being, for his survival, he needs a group. Unsurprisingly, a large proportion of our instincts and programmed behaviors are geared toward building intragroup relationships — collaboration and competition for resources. There are three basic strategies for this interaction: take, give and exchange. More details – in this material, prepared according to the book “Find a Mentor“.
Find a mentor
Depending on the circumstances, we can use any of the three strategies, but, as a rule, each of us has one that we prefer.
“Exchangers” – these are those who act on the principle “I give, so that you give me too.” They are the majority in society. Their focus is justice.
“The takers” – focused on maximizing their own benefits in a relationship. The interests of others do not bother them.
Finally, there is also “Givers” – these people are focused on selfless help to others. Their focus is relationships.
Which of these strategies is more winning? Based on the research data, the following can be said. In the early stages, the takers are the most successful, while the givers are the outsiders.
As you move up, the picture changes to the opposite. There are almost no “takers” at the heights of success. But among those who have achieved outstanding results, there are unexpectedly many “giving”. The “exchangers” show stable average results at all levels.
People who are focused on their own benefit rarely reach the top. The reasons for this are obvious. A systematic disregard for the interests of others alienates those around them and increases hostility. In other words, within the framework of this strategy, each subsequent step repels friends and multiplies enemies. As a result, sooner or later, a person remains alone. It’s good if by that time he manages to reach the top.
But even so, success often looks like this: you are sitting in a tree, under which a pack of hungry wolves has gathered.
Another strategy of greatest interest is “give”. According to research conducted, most selfless and selfless altruists who are concerned about the welfare of others and are willing to help them to the detriment of their own interests are losers, which seems quite natural. On the other hand, it is the “givers” who achieve the greatest successes.
Why? Is this a game of chance, or is there some factor that distinguishes successful givers from unsuccessful ones? Such a factor really exists. And this is your environment. Both are equally trying to help everyone and do not expect immediate rewards. Both those and others in response receive the sympathy and approval of others. Some of them seek to provide a reciprocal service – they are “exchangers”. Some take advantage of the value they receive without considering it necessary to give something in return – these are the “takers.”
The difference between losers and winners is what happens next.
The loser continues to help everyone equally. And here everything depends on the case – how many “takers” will be in his environment. If not enough, he will survive. If there is a lot, it will quickly lose all resources and opportunities for growth. The winner, on the other hand, knows how to identify the “takers” and remove them from his circle, so a network is gradually formed around him, which together brings him more than he put into its formation. From some point on, it becomes a key success factor. And the sooner he learns to do this, the higher his chances of achieving outstanding results.
Prepared according to the book “Find a Mentor“.
What is the Difference Between Losers and Winners
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